Appendix A: Background, Economy and Outlook

1. Background

1.1 Both Councils' Treasury Management Strategies for 2016/17 is underpinned by the adoption of the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy's (CIPFA) Code of Practice on Treasury Management 2011, which includes the requirement for determining a treasury strategy on the likely financing and investment activity for the forthcoming financial year.

1.2 The Code also recommends that Members are informed of Treasury Management activities at least twice a year. This report therefore ensures the Councils are embracing best practice in accordance with CIPFA's recommendations.

1.3 Treasury management is defined as: "The management of the local authority's investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks."

1.4 In addition to reporting on risk management related to treasury activities, the Treasury Management Code also requires the Councils to report on any financial instruments entered into to manage treasury risks.

1.5 The instruments and the limits with individual counterparties approved in the 2016/17 Treasury Management Strategy of each Council are as follows:

Type of instrument	BDC limit	MSDC limit
Deposits with banks and building societies	£2m	£1m
AAA rated money market funds	£2m	£2m
Deposits with other local authorities	£1m	£1m
Treasury bills	No limit	No limit
Debt Management Account Deposit Facility	No limit	No limit
Pooled Funds	£5m	£5m
Registered Providers	£5m	£5m
Corporates	£1m	£1m

1.6 The total limits for non-specified investments are shown in the table below:

Non – Specified Investment Limits	BDC and MSDC limit
Total investments without credit ratings	£10m
Total non – specified investments	£10m
Total loans to unrated corporates	£1m

1.7 In terms of which banks and building societies are included on the Councils' counterparty list, the advice of our treasury management advisors Arlingclose is used. As market conditions and credit ratings change during the year, institutions are either taken off or put on the list of counterparties that we are happy to lend money to.

1.8 In practice, the Councils do not have the size of deposit that interests the major banks and building societies, so on a daily basis it is usually money market funds, short-term deposits and call accounts that are used to make short term investments.

2. Economic Commentary and Outlook

2.1 The preliminary estimate of Q2 2016 GDP showed reasonably strong growth as the economy grew 0.7% quarter-on-quarter, as compared to 0.4% in Q1 and year/year growth running at a healthy pace of 2.2%. However the UK economic outlook changed significantly on 23rd June 2016. The surprise result of the referendum on EU membership prompted forecasters to rip up previous projections and dust off worst-case scenarios. Growth forecasts had already been downgraded as 2016 progressed, as the very existence of the referendum dampened business investment, but the crystallisation of the risks and the subsequent political turmoil prompted a sharp decline in household, business and investor sentiment.

2.2 The repercussions of this plunge in sentiment on economic growth were judged by the Bank of England to be severe, prompting the Monetary Policy Committee to initiate substantial monetary policy easing at its August meeting to mitigate the worst of the downside risks. This included a cut in Bank Rate to 0.25%, further gilt and corporate bond purchases (QE) and cheap funding for banks (Term Funding Scheme) to maintain the supply of credit to the economy. The minutes of the August meeting also suggested that many members of the Committee supported a further cut in Bank Rate to near-zero levels (the Bank, however, does not appear keen to follow peers into negative rate territory) and more QE should the economic outlook worsen.

2.3 In response to the Bank of England's policy announcement, money market rates and bond yields declined to new record lows. Since the onset of the financial crisis over eight years ago, Arlingclose's rate outlook has progressed from 'lower for longer' to 'even lower for even longer' to, now, 'even lower for the indeterminable future'.

2.4 The new members of the UK government, particularly the Prime Minister and Chancellor, are likely to follow the example set by the Bank of England. After six years of fiscal consolidation, the Autumn Statement on 23rd November is likely to witness fiscal initiatives to support economic activity and confidence, most likely infrastructure investment. Tax cuts or something similar cannot be ruled out.

2.5 Whilst the economic growth consequences of Brexit remain speculative, there is uniformity in expectations that uncertainty over the UK's future trade relations with the EU and the rest of the world will weigh on economic activity and business investment, dampen investment intentions and tighten credit availability, prompting lower activity levels and potentially a rise in unemployment. These effects will dampen economic growth through the second half of 2016 and in 2017.

2.6 Meanwhile, inflation is expected to pick up due to a rise in import prices, dampening real wage growth and real investment returns. The August Quarterly Inflation Report from the Bank of England forecasts a rise in CPI to 0.9% by the end of calendar 2016 and thereafter a rise closer to the Bank's 2% target over the coming year, as previous rises in commodity prices and the sharp depreciation in sterling begin to drive up imported material costs for companies.

2.7 The rise in inflation is highly unlikely to prompt monetary tightening by the Bank of England, with policymakers looking through import-led CPI spikes, concentrating instead on the negative effects of Brexit on economic activity and, ultimately, inflation.

3. Market Reaction

3.1 Following the referendum result gilt yields fell sharply across the maturity spectrum on the view that Bank Rate would remain extremely low for the foreseeable future. The yield on the 10-year gilt fell from 1.37% on 23rd June to a low of 0.52% in August, a quarter of what it was at the start of 2016. The 10-year gilt yield has since risen to 0.69% at the end of September. The yield on 2- and 3-year gilts briefly dipped into negative territory intra-day on 10th August to -0.1% as prices were driven higher by the Bank of England's bond repurchase programme. However both yields have since recovered to 0.07% and 0.08% respectively.

3.2 On the other hand, after an initial sharp drop, equity markets appeared to have shrugged off the result of the referendum and bounced back despite warnings from the IMF on the impact on growth from Brexit as investors counted on QE-generated liquidity to drive risk assets.

3.3 The most noticeable fall in money market rates was for very short-dated periods (overnight to 1 month) where rates fell to between 0.1% and 0.2%

4. Outlook for the remainder of 2016/17

The economic outlook for the UK has immeasurably altered following the popular vote to leave the EU. The long-term position of the UK economy will be largely dependent on the agreements the government is able to secure with the EU, particularly with regard to Single Market access.

The short to medium-term outlook as been more downbeat due to the uncertainty generated by the result and the forthcoming negotiations. Economic and political uncertainty will likely dampen or delay investment intentions, prompting lower activity levels and potentially a rise in unemployment. The downward trend in growth apparent on the run up to the referendum may continue through the second half of 2016, although some economic data has held up better than was initially expected, perhaps suggesting a less severe slowdown than feared.

Arlingclose has changed its central case for the path of Bank Rate over the next three years. Arlingclose believes any currency-driven inflationary pressure will be looked through by Bank of England policymakers. Arlingclose's central case is for Bank Rate to remain at 0.25%, but there is a 40% possibility of a drop to close to zero, with a small chance of a reduction below zero.

Gilt yields are forecast to be broadly flat from current levels, albeit experiencing short-term volatility.

	Dec-16	Mar-17	Jun-17	Sep-17	Dec-17	Mar-18	Jun-18	Sep-18	Dec-18	Mar-19	Jun-19	Sep-19	Dec-19
Official Bank Rate													
Upside risk	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Arlingclose Central Case	**0.25**	**0.25**	**0.25**	**0.25**	**0.25**	**0.25**	**0.25**	**0.25**	**0.25**	**0.25**	**0.25**	**0.25**	**0.25**
Downside risk	-0.25	-0.25	-0.25	-0.25	-0.25	-0.50	-0.50	-0.50	-0.50	-0.50	-0.50	-0.50	-0.50

Global interest rate expectations have been pared back considerably. There remains a possibility that the Federal Reserve will wait until after November's presidential election, and probably hike interest rates in in December 2016 but only if economic conditions warrant.

In addition, Arlingclose believes that the Government and the Bank of England have both the tools and the willingness to use them to prevent market-wide problems leading to bank insolvencies. The cautious approach to credit advice means that the banks currently on the Council's counterparty list have sufficient equity buffers to deal with any localised problems in the short term.